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Abstract
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various
government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such
a manner so as to attain optimized resource allocation, is the Com-
binatorial Auctioning System (CAS). We study another important
aspect of resource allocations in CAS, namely fairness. We present
two important notions of fairness in CAS, extended fairness and basic
fairness. We give an algorithm that works by incorporating a met-
ric to ensure fairness in a CAS that uses the Vickrey-Clark-Groves
(VCG) mechanism, and uses an algorithm of Sandholm to achieve op-
timality. Mathematical formulations are given to represent measures
of extended fairness and basic fairness.
Keywords: fairness, optimality, multi-agent systems, combinatorial auc-
tions
1 Introduction
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) have been an interesting topic in the areas of
decision theory and game theory. MAS are composed of a number of au-
tonomous agents. In some applications, these autonomous agents act in a
self-interested manner in their dealings with numerous other agents. Even
∗Corresponding author.
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in game theory, in an interactive framework the decision of one agent often
affects that of another. This behavior is seen in the MAS which mainly deal
with issues like resource allocation [4, 19]. In such scenarios, each agent
holds different preferences over the various possible allocations and hence,
concepts like individual rationality, fairness, optimality, efficiency, etc., are
important [7]. In this paper, we study a framework where optimality is a
desirable property but fairness is a required property. An excellent example
of such a framework is Combinatorial Auctioning Systems (CAS) where the
two most important issues pertaining to resource allocation are optimality
and fairness.
Incorporation of fairness into game theory and economics is a significant
issue. Its welfare implications in different systems were explored by Ra-
bin [16]. The problem of fair allocation is being resolved in various MAS
by using different procedures depending upon the technique of allocation
of goods and the nature of goods. Brams and Taylor give the analysis of
procedures for dividing divisible and indivisible items and resolving disputes
among the self-interested agents [3]. Some of the procedures described by
them include the “Divide and Choose” method of allocation of divisible goods
among two agents to ensure the fair allocation of goods which also exhibits
the property of “envy-freeness,” a property first introduced by Foley [10].
Lucas’ method of markers and Knaster’s method of sealed bids are described
for MAS comprising more than two players and for the division of indivisible
items. The Adjusted-Winner (AW) procedure is also defined by Brams [2]
for envy-freeness and equitability in two-agent systems. Various other proce-
dures like moving knife procedures for cake cutting are defined for the MAS
comprising three or more agents [2, 1].
However, it can also be seen that the definition of fairness varies across the
different multi-agent systems, i.e., the term fairness is perceived differently
in various MAS with regard to the resource allocation. In some MAS, it
can be defined as equitable distribution of resources such that each recipient
believes that it receives its fair share. Thus, each agent likes its share at
least as much as that of other agents’ share and, thereby, it is also known
as envy-free division of resources [2]. But this definition of fairness is not
applicable to all the MAS. To explain the notions of fairness in MAS, we
classify fairness into extended fairness and basic fairness in this paper.
To illustrate these notions of fairness mathematically, we shall use the
framework of the Combinatorial Auctioning Systems (CAS). The CAS is a
kind of MAS whereby the bidders can express preferences over combination
2
of items [15, 13]. The CAS approach is being used by different government
agencies like the FCC [9] and numerous business applications like logistics
and transportation [5, 6], supply chain formation [20], B2B negotiations [11],
etc. It has been noticed that one of the significant issues in CAS is that of
resource allocation. Optimum resource allocation is one of the most desir-
able properties in a CAS, and deals mainly with the Winner Determination
Problem (WDP) [18, 14]. Determining the winner in a CAS so as to max-
imize revenue is an NP-complete problem. However, it is seen that besides
WDP, fairness is another important objective in many CAS-like government
auctions. Rothkopf expressed his view in [17] that “optimal solution to the
winner determination problem, while desirable, is not required. What is re-
quired is a guarantee that the auction will be fair and will be perceived as
fair.” Hence, we realize the significance of fairness in CAS.
We shall consider a CAS that uses the Sandholm algorithm and the con-
cept of a Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) [13]. Sandholm’s algorithm
is a method to determine the optimal allocation of resources [18] in a CAS.
The concept of single-round second-price sealed-bid auction is then used to
determine the payment made by the winners. According to this, the pay-
ment made by a winner is determined by the second-highest bid. In order to
achieve fairness in such a CAS, we extend this existing payment scheme and
take into consideration the fair values of resources as perceived by the bidders
and the auctioneer in the system. Based upon their estimate of fair values,
payments are made by the winners. A detailed analysis is done to high-
light some important properties exhibited by this extension of the payment
scheme.
We start by classifying fairness and explain its different notions in Sec-
tion 2. It is followed by our study on CAS in Section 3 and mathematical
formulations are given that are used to extend the payment scheme to achieve
fairness in CAS. Section 4 gives a detail analysis of the scheme that high-
lights the attractive properties in our payment scheme. We conclude with
Section 5 which offers some conclusions about our efforts, and some sugges-
tions for further work along these lines.
2 Classification of Fairness
To explain the different notions of fairness in various MAS, we classify fairness
as Basic Fairness and Extended Fairness. This section defines the various
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perceptions about measuring fairness in MAS.
In our analysis, we do not consider agent preferences as being apart from
their bids, i.e., if an agent has a higher preference for something, it is con-
sidered to indicate the same by a higher bid, and vice versa. All goods are
considered divisible.
Our algorithm given in Section 3.1.2 creates an allocation that is seen as
having fairness (either basic or extended) by all agents in the system.
2.1 Basic Fairness
In many MAS, there occurs a need of allocating the resources in an equitable
manner, i.e., each agent gets an equitable share of the resources. This hap-
pens mainly when every agent holds similar significance for the given set of
resources and has a desire to procure it. Thus, it becomes necessary to allo-
cate the resources in an equitable fashion, i.e., such that each agent believes
that its share is comparable to the share of other agents. Thus, none of the
agents hold preferences over the share of other agents. Hence, we say that
every agent believes that the set of resources is divided fairly among all the
agents. This concept of fairness is termed as basic fairness.
Definition 2.1. When allocation is perceived to be fair in comparison to
the other agents i.e. share of all the agents is comparable, basic fairness is
said to be achieved in resource allocation.
This kind of fairness is required in the applications whereby fairness is
the key issue rather than the individual satisfaction of the self-interested
agents. In such applications, it becomes necessary to divide a resource set
in an equitable fashion so that every agent believes that it is receiving its
fair share from the set of resources. Hence, we see that every agent enjoys
material equality and this ensures basic fairness among them. In other words,
the concept of basic fairness also ensures egalitarian social welfare [8] and
envy-freeness [2].
An example of such application that pertains to the equitable allocation
of resources is given by Lematre [7]. It deals with the equitable distribution of
Earth Observing Satellite (EOS) Resources. EOS is co-funded and exploited
by a number of agents and its mission is to acquire images of specific areas
on earth surface, in response to observation demands from agents. However,
due to some exploitation constraints and due to large number of demands,
a set of demands, each of which could be satisfied individually, may not be
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satisfiable in a single day. Thus, exploitation of EOS should ensure that each
agent gets an equitable share in the EOS resources, i.e., the demands of each
agent is given equal weight assuming that agents have equal rights over the
resource (we assume that they have funded the satellite equally). Hence,
we observe that basic fairness is achieved as the demands of all agents are
entertained by the equitable distribution of EOS resources.
2.2 Extended Fairness
In every MAS, we observe that each agent intends to procure a resource at a
value that is perceived by it to be fair for the procurement. In other words,
every agent assigns a fair value to each resource that determines its estimate
of the value of the resource in quantitative terms. The fair value attached to
each resource can be expressed in monetary terms in most MAS. Thus, an
agent intends to procure a resource by trading it with cash which is equal to
the fair value attached to the resource by the respective agent. In such cases,
each agent believes that it procures the resource at a fair value and, hence,
believes the allocation to be fair.
However, it is important to mention that the fair value attached to each
resource by an agent does not necessarily reflect the utility value of the
resource to it. An agent may hold a higher or lower utility value for a
resource irrespective of the fair value attached to the resource by it. Thus,
the fair value attached to a resource is an estimate of the actual value of the
resource in the system as perceived by an agent in quantitative terms. It
means that an agent is always willing to trade a resource at its fair value.
The resource procurement in such MAS is perceived to be fair by every
agent. Resources are allocated to the agents based upon different criteria of
optimality in a system. However, it is assured that each agent that procures
a resource perceives the trade to be fair. The other aspects of allocation
like resources procured by other agents, fair values attached to the resource
by other agents, utility value of the resource to other agents, etc., are not
considered while an agent trades a resource with its fair value. Thus, we see
that the kind of fairness that is achieved in such system is irrespective of
other agents and hence, we term it as extended fairness.
Definition 2.2. When allocation is perceived to be fair by an individual
agent procuring a resource, and is irrespective of the measures attached by
other agents, extended fairness is said to be achieved in resource allocation.
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An example of such a system can be explained through a scenario of job
allocations in a multi-national company. Consider a MAS that refers to a
company hiring situation, comprising an agent offering the job positions (i.e.,
the owner’s agent) and a number of self-interested agents who contend for
these jobs. The contending agents express their estimate of the fair value
through their curriculum vitae that is submitted to the owner agent, i.e.,
each contending agent believes that its curriculum vita fulfills the minimum
requirements for the job and that it is eligible for the job. Hence, the agents
define their perception of the required qualifications for the job through their
curriculum vitae and believe it to be sufficient to qualify for the job. The
owner agent selects the job-seeker agent that holds at least minimum qualifi-
cations required for the job but holds the maximum qualifications among all
the contending agents. Thus, the job is allocated to the agent whose curricu-
lum vita matches this criterion. Hence, the allocation is perceived to be fair
by the winning agent and by all other agents as it is allocated to the most
deserving among all the agents. Hence, the job is allocated to the agent on
the basis of its curriculum vita, i.e., an agent acquires a job at its estimate
of the fair value of the qualifications required for the job.
Thus, we see the two broad classification of fairness that explains different
notions of fairness as perceived by the agents in different MAS. To explain
these notions of fairness mathematically, we shall study a framework where
fairness is a required property in resource allocation. However, we also see
that resource allocation deals with another key issue of optimality in vari-
ous MAS. Thus, the best example of resource allocation framework where
both optimality and fairness are the key issues is Combinatorial Auctioning
Systems (CAS).
3 Fairness in Combinatorial Auctioning Sys-
tems (CAS)
Combinatorial Auctioning Systems are a kind of MAS which comprise an
auctioneer and a number of self-interested bidders. The auctioneer aims
at allocating the available resources among the bidders who, in turn, bid
for sets of resources to procure them in order to satisfy their needs. The
bidders aim at procuring the resources at minimum value during the bidding
process, while the auctioneer aims at maximizing the revenue generated by
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the allocation of these resources. Thus, CAS refers to a scenario where the
bidders bid for the set of resources and the auctioneer allocates the same to
the highest-bidding agent in order to maximize the revenue. Hence, we see
that optimality is one of the key issues in CAS. The Sandholm algorithm
is used here to attain optimal allocation of resources. It works by making
an allocation tree and carrying out some preprocessing steps like pruning to
make the steps faster without compromising the optimality [13, 18].
However, besides optimality, another key issue desired by some auctioning
systems is fairness. To incorporate this significant property in this resource
allocation procedure, we propose an algorithm which uses a metric to measure
fairness for each agent and determines the final payment made by the winning
bidders.
The algorithm that we describe is based upon a CAS that uses the Sand-
holm algorithm for achieving optimality, and an incentive-compatible mech-
anism called Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) as the pricing mechanism
that determines the payments to be given by the winning bidders. The Gen-
eralized Vickrey Auction (GVA) has a payoff structure that is designed in a
manner such that each winning agent gets a discount on its actual bid. This
discount is called a Vickrey Discount, and is defined in [13] as the extent by
which the total revenue to the seller is increased due to the presence of that
winning bidder, i.e., the marginal contribution of the winning bidder to the
total revenue.
We give mathematical formulations to show that both kinds of fairness
can be achieved in CAS. We show that extended fairness is achieved in all
cases except in case of a tie, in which case basic fairness is ensured.
3.1 Mathematical Formulation
3.1.1 Terminology
Let our CAS be a multi-agent system which is defined by the following enti-
ties:
(i) A set Φ comprising m resources r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 for which the bids are
raised.
(ii) A set ξ comprising n bidders b0, b1, . . . , bn−1. These are the agents
among whom the resources are allocated.
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(iii) An auctioneer, denoted by λ, is the initial owner of all the resources
and invites bids in the auctions.
Let us consider a CAS that comprises three bidders b0, b1, b2, an auctioneer
denoted as λ, and three resources r0, r1, r2. Each bidder is privileged to bid
upon any combination of these resources. We denote the combinations or
subsets of these resources as {r0}, {r1}, {r2}, {r0, r1}, {r0, r2}, {r1, r2},
{r0, r1, r2}. We shall use the term package to define a set that comprises the
subsets of resources won by a bidder. For example, a package for a bidder
winning the subsets {r0} and {r1} is defined as {{r0}, {r1}}.
Assume that the auctioneer and each bidder has fair valuation for each
of the individual resource (say, in dollars) as shown in Table 1.
Definition 3.1. The fair valuation for an agent represents its estimate of
the actual value of the resource.
Thus, fair valuation by a bidder and an auctioneer for each resource
represents their estimate of the actual value of each resource. Thus, a bidder
is willing to trade a resource at its fair value and also believes that no loss
is incurred by the seller in the trade. Similarly, the auctioneer is willing to
sell a resource at the fair valuation described for it by him. Fair value for a
combination of resources can be calculated as the sum of the fair value for
each of the resources in that combination. The fair valuation for a resource
by a bidder does not refer to the utility measure of the resource for the bidder.
We shall use the term fair valuation and fair value interchangeably.
r0 r1 r2
Bidder b0 5 8 8
Bidder b1 10 2 8
Bidder b2 10 5 10
Auctioneer, λ 8 10 15
Table 1: Fair valuations for each resource by all bidders
From Table 1, we can see that the bidder b0 values resource r0 for $5, r1
for $8 and r2 for $10. This means that bidder b0 is willing to trade resource
r0 with $5, r1 with $8 and r2 with $8 and believes that no loss is incurred
by the auctioneer in this trade. The fair valuation for the subset {r0, r2} for
the bidder b0 is calculated as the sum of his the fair values for r0 and r2 i.e.
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5 + 8 = $13. Similarly, fair valuation for a package is the sum of the fair
valuation of the comprising sets i.e. for a package {r0}, {r1, r2}}, the fair
value is the sum of the fair values of {r0} and {r1, r2}.
Let the bids raised by the bidders for the individual resource and different
combination of resources be as given in table2. It can be seen that the bids
raised by each of the bidder for different sets of resources may or may not be
equal to the fair valuation of the respective set of resources. A bidder can
put zero bids for the set of resources it does not wish to procure.
r0 r1 r2 {r0, r1} {r0, r2} {r1, r2} {r0, r1, r2}
Bidder b0 0 10 5 0 20 15 50
Bidder b1 10 5 10 30 0 0 50
Bidder b2 10 0 15 20 30 0 30
Table 2: Bids raised by the bidders for different combination of resources
It is assumed that the bidding language used in our system is OR bids, i.e.,
a bidder can submit any number of bids and is willing to obtain any number
of atomic bids for a price equal to the sum of their prices [15, 13, 18]. Recall
that the set of all the bids won by a bidder is referred to as a package.
(a) A set D which is a subset of the set of natural numbers, i.e., D ⊆ N,
describing the possible values (in dollars) given to resources by bidders.
(b) A fairness matrix, Γi,[1×m], for the bidder bi, and Γλ,[1×m] for the auc-
tioneer, λ, is defined as :
Γi = [τi,0, τi,1, . . . , τi,m−1], for the bidder bi.
Γλ = [τλ,0, τλ,1, . . . , τλ,m−1], for the auctioneer, λ.
where the function τi is defined by a bidder, bi, for a resource, rj as:
τi(rj) = d, d ∈ D
This function represents a fair valuation of a resource, rj, by a bidder
bi. From table 1, we have τ0 (r1) = 8, τ1 (r1) = 2, etc. Thus, from table
1, we have the following fairness matrices: Γ0 = [5, 8, 8]; Γ1 = [10, 2,
8]; Γ2 = [10, 5, 10]; Γλ = [ 8, 10, 15]
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(c) A function Υi,k, known as the pay function by a bidder, bi is defined
as:
Υi,k (bi,Ψk) = d
where Psik = {µj|µj ∈ set of resources won by bidderbi}, and Υi,k is
the cost of the package, Ψk, to the bidder bi as calculated from the
GVA payment scheme.
3.1.2 Algorithm To Incorporate Extended Fairness In CAS
(1) Each bidder and the auctioneer define its fairness matrix before the
start of bidding process. It is a sealed matrix and is unsealed at the
end of bidding process.
(2) An allocation tree is constructed at the end of the bidding process
to determine the optimum allocation and the winning bidders [18].
Information about all the bidders in a tie is not discarded using some
pre-defined criteria.
(3) Use GVA pricing mechanism to calculate the Vickrey discount [13]
and, hence, payments by the winning bidders for their corresponding
packages, i.e., calculate Υij for the package Ψj won by the bidder bi.
(4) Calculate the fair value of the package won by each bidder and denote
it as Πij for the bidder bi who wins the package Ψj.
(5) Also calculate the fair value of each package using the fairness matrix
of the auctioneer and denote it as Πλj for a package Ψj .
(6) Compare the values of Πλj and Υij and determine the final payment
by the bidder depending upon the following conditions:
Case 1: Υij > Πλj Bidder pays the amount Υij and the auctioneer gains
profit equal to (Υij −Πλj) which is distributed among other bidders who bid
for the package Ψj. The profit is distributed in a proportional manner, i.e.,
in the ratio of (Πkj − Πλj)/(Πλj) for a bidder bk who also bid for Ψj but is
not a winning bidder.
Case 2: Υij = Πλj In this case, the bidder pays the amount Υij to the
auctioneer.
Case 3: Υij < Πλj Auctioneer suffers a loss of amount (Πλj −Υij). How-
ever, loss can be recovered as per the following cases:
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(i) Πij > Πλj Bidder’s estimate of fair valuation is more than Υij . Thus,
bidder gives the final payment of Πλj to the auctioneer.
(ii) Πij = Piλj Bidder’s estimate of fair value is same as that of auctioneer’s
estimate and is greater than the value Υij . Thus, bidder pays amount
Πij to the auctioneer.
(iii) Πij < Πλj
(a) Πij ≤ Υij : then bidder’s final payment remains the same, i.e.,
Υij
(b) Πij > Υij : then bidder’s final payment is equal to Πij.
3.1.3 Handling the cases of tie - Incorporating Basic Fairness
Unlike traditional algorithms, we do not discard the bids in the cases of a tie
on the basis of some pre-decided criterion. We consider these cases in our
algorithm to provide basic fairness to the bidders.
In cases of a tie, we shall measure the utility value of the resource to each
bidder in the tie.
Definition 3.2. The utility value of a resource to a bidder is defined as the
quantified measure of satisfaction or happiness derived by the procurement
of the resource.
Mathematically, we define utility value for a resource set µj as:
υi(µj) = νi(µj)− Πij
where νi(µj) is the bid value of the resource µj and Πij is the fair valuation
for the resource set µj for the bidder bi.
The bidders maximize this utility value to quantify the importance and
their need for the resource to them. Thus, the higher the utility value, the
greater is the need for the resource set.
In such a case, fairness can be imparted if the resource set µj is divided
among all the bidders in a proportional manner, i.e., in accordance to the
utility value attached to the resource by each bidder.
Let us consider the same example to explain the concept of basic fairness
in our system. From table 2, we observe that the optimum allocation attained
through allocation tree comprises the resource set {r0, r1, r2} as it generates
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the maximum revenue of $50. However, we see that this bid is raised by the
two bidders, b0 and b1.
Thus, we calculate the fair value of the resource set µ1 = {r0, r1, r2} for
the bidder b0 and b1, i.e., Π01 = 5+8+8 = $21 and Π11 = 10+2+8 = $20.
Thus, the utility value of the resource set µ0 for the bidder b0 and b1 is as
follows:
for bidder b0, υ0(µ1) = 50 - 21 = $29, and
for bidder b1, υ1(µ1) = 50 - 20 = $30.
Hence, the resource set µ1 is divided among bidders, b0 and b1, in the
ratio of 29:30. In other words, bidder b0 gets 49.15% and bidder b1 gets
50.85% of the resource set µ1.
The payment made by the bidders is also done in the similar proportional
manner. For example, the bidders, b0 and b1, make their respective payments
in the ratio of 29:30 to make up a total of $50 for the auctioneer, i.e., bidder
b0 pays $24.65 and bidder b1 pays $25.35 to the auctioneer for their respective
shares.
Hence, we see that extended fairness as well as basic fairness are achieved
in CAS by using a fairness metric. We take into account the fair estimates
of the auctioneer and the bidders for each resource to ensure that fairness is
achieved to auctioneer as well as the bidders.
We shall do a detailed analysis of the new mechanism in the following
section.
4 Analysis
A detailed analysis is done to highlight some important concepts used and the
significant properties exhibited by our CAS through our payment mechanism.
4.1 Fairness
In MAS, every agent has its own metric to measure fairness with regards to
the allocation of resources. In CAS, we see that the auctioneer and the bid-
ders have their own estimate of the fairness value attached to each resource.
We introduced the concept of fairness matrix to attain the knowledge of
the fair value attached to each resource by the auctioneer and each bidder.
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This matrix is used as a metric to ensure that each allocation of resources is
perceived to be a fair allocation by the bidder as well as the auctioneer.
Thus, we say that extended fairness is achieved when a bidder procures
a resource for an amount that is equal to its estimate of fair value of that
resource. In such a case, the bidder believes that the resource was procured
by it at a fair amount irrespective of other bidders’ estimate of fair value of
that resource. Thus, the allocation is believed to be extendedly fair as per
the estimates of the winning bidder.
We also see that basic fairness is achieved in our system when there is
more than one bidder who has raised equal bid for the same set of resources.
In such a case, we divide the set of resources among all the bidders so as to
ensure fairness to all the bidders in a tie. However, this division of resources
set is done in a proportional manner. We intend to divide the resource such
that the bidder holding highest utility value to it should get the biggest share.
To ensure this, we calculate the utility value (i.e., υi(µj) = νi(µj) − Πij) of
the set of resources to each bidder and divide the set in the ratio of these
values among the respective bidders. Thus, we see that each bidder procures
its basic share of the set of resources in accordance to the basic importance
attached by the bidder to the set of resources.
Due to the achievement of fairness through our payment scheme, the
bidders are expected to show willingness to participate in the auctions.
4.2 Rationality
We shall see that the fairness matrix is a metric for fair valuation that forces
the bidders and the auctioneer to behave rationally. In other words, they
attain maximum profits if they describe their fair matrix truthfully. Our
system ensures certain behavioral traits of auctioneer and the bidders through
which this property of rationality is achieved in our system. These behavioral
traits are described in the following:
Proposition 4.1. The auctioneer does not state extremely high or low values
in its fairness matrix as this does not generate higher revenue.
Proof. If an auctioneer states very high values in its fairness matrix, then
Case 3 follows most of the times. From Case 3, we observe that the auctioneer
receives a payment equal to Πλj only if this value is comparable to that of Πij
for a bidder bi. In other words, an auctioneer benefits only if its valuation is
not irrationally higher than that of the bidder. On contrary, the auctioneer
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does not state very low values in its fairness matrix. For such circumstances,
Case 1 follows, whereby it seems to be that the auctioneer gains profit and,
hence, it is distributed among the bidders.
Proposition 4.2. Bidders do not state extremely high or low values in the
fairness matrix as it does not help them procure the resources at lower values.
Proof. We see that the Case 3 deals with the fairness values of the bidder bi.
In case Υij < Πλj and Πλj < Πij, the bidder pays the amount Πλj . Otherwise
if Υij ≤ Πij ≤ Πλj , the bidder pays the amount equal to Πij . In both the
cases, we see that the value to be paid is higher than the bid value. However,
if the bidder is in a tie for a resource set, then its utility value falls negative
if Υij ≤ Πij . Hence, the bidder does not get the profits which are distributed
among other bidders in a tie. Thus, a bidder undergoes a loss if the value of
Πij is very high. On contrary, the bidder does not state lower values in the
fairness matrix. In this case, a loss is perceived by the bidder under Case 3,
condition (iii), part (a).
Proposition 4.3. Bidders raise their bids truthfully.
Proof. Bidders gain by bidding truthfully. On bidding truthfully, they can
maximize the Vickrey Discount on their bids. Secondly, in the cases of tie,
they can maximize the profit earned (υi(µj) = νi(µj)−Πij), i.e., for a given
value of Πij , profit can be maximized by raising the bids truthfully.
4.3 Incentive Compatibility
The payment mechanism described in our system is incentive compatible in
certain cases. In the cases, when payment value for a package, as calculated
from the VCG mechanism, is greater than the fair valuation of the auctioneer
for the same package, then Case 1 follows, i.e., the auctioneer gets an amount
higher than its fair valuation for that package. It means that the auctioneer
gains the profit equal to (Υij − Πλj). This profit is distributed among the
bidders who bid for the same package in the proportional manner as explained
in Case 1.
Thus, it also forces the bidders to bid truthfully so as to gain maximum
benefits from the auctioning system.
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4.4 Efficiency
The cases of a tie are handled in such a way so as to ensure basic fairness.
In such a case, we divide the resource in proportion to its utility value to
a bidder. Thus, a resource is allocated in accordance to the wishes of the
consumers and, hence, the net benefit attained through its use is maximized.
In other words, we can say that our system is allocatively efficient as the
resources are allocated to the bidders who value them most and can derive
maximum benefits through their use. Hence, we achieve allocative efficiency
by handling the cases of tie in an efficient manner.
4.5 Optimality
Optimality is a significant property that is desired in a CAS. We ensure this
property by the use of Sandholm algorithm in our system. It is used to obtain
the optimum allocation of resources so as to maximize the revenue generated
for the auctioneer. Thus, output obtained is the most optimal output and
there is no other allocation that generates more revenues than the current
allocation.
5 Conclusion
Thus, we have shown that fairness is incorporated in CAS, whereby all the
agents receive their fair share if they behave rationally. Extended fairness as
well as basic fairness is attained through our payment mechanism. Optimal
allocation is obtained through the Sandholm algorithm and the other signif-
icant properties like allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility are also
achieved. This is an improvement because in the existing world of multi-agent
systems, there do not seem to be many studies that attempt to incorporate
optimality as well as fairness. The present paper addresses this lack in a
specific multi-agent system, namely, the CAS.
However, this work can be extended towards achieving a generalized
framework suitable for all, or at least many, multi-agent systems, rather
than just CAS.
The framework described can also be extended in several ways: one is to
de-centralize the suggested algorithm, to avoid use of a single dedicated auc-
tioneer. Especially in distributed computing environments, it would be best
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for there to be a method to implement the suggested algorithm (or something
close to it) without requiring an agent to act as a dedicated auctioneer.
A second important extension would be to find applications for the work.
Some applications that suggest themselves include distribution of land (a
matter of great concern for governments and people the world over) in a fair
manner. In land auctions where a tie occurs, no pre-defined or idiosyncratic
method need be used to break the tie; rather, the allocation can be done
fairly in the manner suggested.
Fairness is also an important and pressing concern in the computing sci-
ences and information technology, particularly, in distributed computing [12].
It is therefore also of interest to see how our method for achieving fairness
could be applied in such contexts.
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